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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

KEVIN P. GATES,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Plaintiff/ Appellant,
v.

Case No: 890235-CA
Priotity No: 14(b)

CAMILLE HENRIE GATES,
Defendant/Respondent.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, §78-2a-3, as an appeal from a final
Order entered in a civil proceeding.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented by this Appeal include:
1.

Did the Trial Court commit reversible error by

entering an Order modifying the Decree of Divorce which had been
entered in this matter based upon a finding that the Plaintiff
did fail to disclose his true income to Defendant at the time the
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parties entered into a Stipulation, and that the Defendant was
not aware of Plaintiff's income when she agreed to accept $250,00
per month as child support for the minor child of the parties,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,
1.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

A Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter on

June 30, 1983.
2.

A Modification Order was entered on April 11, 1986,

directing the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant the sum of $250.00
per month as and for child support for the minor child of the
parties.
3.

On April 19, 1988, the Defendant filed a Petition

for Modification of Decree of Divorce alleging that the income of
the Plaintiff has increased substantially since entry of the
Modification Order and that he is better able to provide a
greater sum as child support for the benefit of the minor child
of the parties.
4.
1989.

The matter was tried to the Court on February 14,

On March 20, 1989, the Court entered an Order Modifying

the Decree of Divorce to award the Defendant $750.00 per month as
child support and entering a Judgment in favor of the Defendant
for $2,000.00 in attorney's fees.
5.

Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal from the Order

Modifying the Decree of Divorce and Judgment on April 19, 1989.
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6.
6, 1989-

Plaintiff filed a Brief in this matter on September

The Court entered an Order allowing the Defendant an

extension of time until November 4, 1989, in which to file
Respondent's Brief in this matter•
B.
1.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Decree of Divorce entered in this matter on June

30, 1983, directed the Plaintiff to pay $175-00 per month as
child support for the benefit of the minor child of the parties*
[R 19]
2.

On January 7, 1985, the Defendant filed a Motion to

Modify the Decree of Divorce seeking an increase of child support.

[R 22]
3.

The Plaintiff filed a Counter-Request for

Modification seeking a change in rights of visitation with the
parties1 minor child.
4.

[R 54]

The Petitions of each of the parties were argued to

the Domestic Relations Commissioner of the Third District Court
on June 20, 1985. The Commissioner entered a Recommendation that
Defendant's Petition to increase child support should be denied
because there was not a substantial change in circumstance since
entry of the Decree of Divorce.
5.

[R 62]

The Defendant rejected the Recommendation of the

Commissioner and a hearing was held before the Court on July 18,
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1985.

At that hearing before the Court evidence was presented

that the Plaintiff's income before federal and state tax was
$2,213.00 per month.

[R 66 and R 48]

Plaintiff also presented

evidence that his net income after tax and expenses was $513.76
per month.

[R 66 and R 49]

Finally, Plaintiff presented evi-

dence that his income after personal expenses was a negative
figure of $665.19.
6.

[R 66 and R 50]

Following the hearing the Court entered its Findings

of Fact and Conclusions of Law on January 14, 1986, finding that
the Plaintiff's gross income at the time of the divorce was
$2,213.12 per month and that his income at the time of the
hearing was $2,131.58 per month.

[R 68]

Based upon those fin-

dings the Court concluded that there had not been a material
change of circumstance.
7.

[R 69]

The Court entered its Order on January 14, 1986,

denying Defendant's Motion to modify the provisions in the Decree
of Divorce with respect to increasing child support.

[R 72] On

April 11, 1986, a Stipulation for Modification was filed with the
Clerk of the Court providing that the Plaintiff would pay the
Defendant $250.00 per month as child support and further providing that beginning with the month of September, 1987, child
support would be increased to $300.00 per month.

[R 7 3 and R 74]

The Stipulation of the parties also contained a provision
stating:
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The parties acknowledged that this Stipulation is
based upon circumstances of each party as they presently
exist • . . [R 75]
Pursuant

In I lu« innis nil I he ,;l ipul.il inn I Iin I'uuit

entered a Modification Order on April 1 1 , 1986, directing that
child support would be increased

:

:

beginning with the month of September

M

.00 per month, that
i7

clii ] d suppoi : !:: would

be increased to $300.00 per month, and that the Order is based
upon circumstances as they presently exist.
9.

[R 76 through 78]

The Plaintiff filed a Petition for Modification of

Divorce Decree on May 18

19 87, seeking a change of custody of

the parties" minor child.

[R 79]

On September 11, 1987, an

Order was entered dismissing the Plaintiff's Petition for
Modification.

[R 98]
i

•

*>? *v. i- : f j 1 eci a Petj ti on

for Modification of Decree of Divorce which alleged a substantial
change of circumstance since the entry of the Modification Order
and prayed for an j ncrease of ch :i 1 d si Ippor f: asked that th e parties share equally in any and all uninsured medical expenses for
the minor child and asking for an award of attorney's fees.
121

[R

1 :! 1:1:01 ijigl: ] 23]

11.

The Plaintiff 1 s Petition was tried before the

Court on February 1 4 , 1989.
12.

[R 154]

The Defendant testified . it : br. i al that the Plaintiff

approached her in approximately August or September of 1985,
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following the hearing which had taken place in July, 1985, and
the Plaintiff told the Defendant that he knew she needed more
money and that he would give her more money if she would give him
the tax exemption for their minor child.

[Trans.

P.5, L.2

through P.6, L.19]
13.

A verbal agreement setting out the parameters of

the Stipulation which was entered by the Court on April 11, 1986,
was reached by the parties some time during September or October,
1985.

[Trans. P.11, L.5 through L.22]

The Defendant

commenced to pay the increased child support in October, 1985.
[Trans. P.7, L.20 through P.9, L.18]
14.

At the time the parties entered into the

Stipulation to increase child support, the Defendant was not
aware of the Plaintiff's income and believed that the Plaintiff's
income was the same as he had represented to the Court during the
proceedings in July, 1985.

[Trans. P.17, L.6 though L.13]

The Defendant provided no information regarding his income at the
time the parties entered into the Stipulation either by a verbal
affirmation or by providing any documentation of his income.
[Trans. P.17, L.14 through P.18, L.9; Trans. P.26, L.10 through
L.13]
15.

At the time the parties entered into the

Stipulation to modify the payment of child support in 1986, the
Plaintiff was earning approximately $9,000.00 per month as gross
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income.

The Plaintiff testified at trial that he told the

Defendant he was making $8-10,000.00 per month*
L.12 througl 1 L.23]

The Plaintii*

-

[Trans. P.47,

testified that the

discussions which resulted in the Stipulation to increase support
in 1986, began in September
the parties

. *M -\

Modification had been denied.

'*
.

approximately one month after
*

.ef end ant " '. I }e t;1t j on I «''»t

[Trans. P.48, L.12 through

L.18]
16 . During the tri a I , the Coi n: t a Inii tted D e f e n d a n t s
Exhibit "24", a copy of the Plaintiff's tax return for 1985.
Plaintiff's 1935 tax return showed a monthly income of $3,405.00
per month

[Trans. P. 52, I., 1 0 through P. 53 , I.. 3 ]

The Court admitted the document to show the disparity between
what Plaintiff claimed as income at the time of trial in July,
1985 and his actual income as shown on his 1985 tax return.
[Trans. P.54, L.16 through L.22]
Tin1! l' I .i i ntiff admitted in

*nss-examJ nation that

the Findings of Fact and the Order entered 1n January, 1986, was
not an accurate statement of the Plaintiff's income at that time.
[Trans P. 0, L.4 through L.7]
18.

At the time of trial on Defendant's Petition for

Modification, February 14, 1989, the Plaintiff's income was
$6,000
19.

The Plaintiff at no time disclosed his income to

the Defendant when the parties entered into the Stipulation to
-7-

increase child support.

[Trans. P.88, L.13 through P.89

L.7]
20.

Counsel for the Defendant was never involved in

negotiations which resulted in the increase in child support, no
Petition was before the Court and no discovery was undertaken.
Counsel for Defendant simply drafted an agreement which was forwarded to counsel for the Plaintiff and subsequently modified to
include the provision that the Stipulation was based upon the
circumstances as they presently existed.

[Dep. of Glen M.

Richman, February 7, 1989, admitted into evidence, Trans. P.29,
L.12 through P.31, L.12]
21.

At the conclusion of the trial, counsel for the

Defendant made a motion pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 15(b), to modify the pleadings to conform to the
evidence presented to the Court asking the Court to amend the
existing Orders based upon misrepresentations to the Court,
misrepresentations to the Defendant and material ommissions of
fact by the Plaintiff by causing the Defendant to enter into the
Stipulation which became the Modification Order of April 11,
1986.

[Trans. P.91, L.2 through L.13]
22.

The Court entered its Findings of Fact that the

Plaintiff's obligation to pay support for the minor child of the
parties was modified by Order dated April 11, 1986, increasing
the child support from $175.00 per month to $250.00 per month.
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The Court then found that there had been no material change in
circumstance regarding Plaintiff's income. However, the Court
found:
Number 3. The most reasonable and credible
assessment of the testimony of the parties is that the
Plaintiff did fail to disclose his true income to the
Defendant at the time the parties entered into the
Stipulation and that Defendant was not aware of
Plaintiff1s income when she agreed to accept $250.00 per
month as child support for the minor child of the
parties.
Number 4. The Plaintifffs income at the time the
parties entered into the agreement and his present
income is in the amount of $6,000.00 per month.
The Court then concluded that there had been no material
change of circumstance but that Plaintiff's failure to disclose
his true income was a material ommission of fact. The Court then
concluded that child support should be increased pursuant to the
Uniform Child Support Guidelines which were applicable at the
time of trial.
23.

[R 166 through 168]

The Court entered its Order modifying the Decree

of Divorce directing the Plaintiff to pay to the Defendant the
sum of $750.00 per month as child support, directed the Plaintiff
to maintain health insurance, awarding the Plaintiff the right to
claim the minor child as a tax return and awarding the Defendant
$2,000.00 in attorney's fees.

[R 170 through 171]
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 52(a), the
Appellate Court should defer to the Trial Court's determination
of the credibility witnesses.

The Trial Court Judge was in the

best position to observe the litigants in person and measure
their credibility.

Absent a showing of clear error, the

Appellant must rely upon the credibility given to each of the
witnesses by the Trial Court.
The Trial* Court in measuring the credibility of the witnesses in this matter determine that the Plaintiff had failed to
be honest in his negotiations to establish child support when the
parties agreed to a Modification in April, 19 86, that the
Plaintiff had either misrepresented his income or failed to
disclose his income and that such misrepresetations or ommissions
were material to the ability of the parties to reach a fair
settlement.

The Court allowed Modification of the Petition pur-

suant to Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to
allege fraud upon the Court by material ommission and amended the
Order of April 11, 1986, upon those grounds rather than upon a
showing of a substantial change of material circumstance.
At the time the parties entered into the Stipulation and
Modification Order of April 11, 1986, there was no action pending
before the Court, no discovery was undertaken and counsel for the

-10-

Defendant was involved only for the purpose of drafting an
agreement reached between the parties without the assistance of
counsel.

There was no bona fide representation of the Defendant

by counsel for the purpose of determining Plaintiff's income.
The Court errored in awarding the Plaintiff the tax
exemption for the minor child of the parties.
Plaintiff's Appeal in this matter is without merit and
not brought in good faith.

It is reasonable that the Defendant

should be awarded such attorney's fees and costs as she may incur
in defending this Appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONTINUING EQUITABLE JURISDICTION
TO ADJUST THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES ENCOMPASSES THE
POWER TO AMEND THE DECREE BASED UPON TACIT FRAUD
RELATING TO MR. GATES' CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION.
The primary thrust of Mr. Gates' Argument on Appeal, is
that he made a good deal for himself in 1986 by failing to
disclose to his wife that he was making $3,000.00 per month more
than at the time they were before the Court in May, 19 85, and the
Court should enforce his tacit fraud upon his wife, child and the
Court, because "there is no change in circumstances" from the
time of entry of the Stipulation Order to the date of the
hearing.

Mr. Gates' position is no more than a tautological
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argument with a false premise: "I made an agreement for a stated
amount in 1986 based upon my income as it then existed.
income hasnft changed, my agreement is still good."

Since my

The false

premise is that equity will tolerate nondisclosure of the true
facts upon which a rational decision should have been made, especially where the detriment flowing from the dishonesty directly
deprives a person not a party to the "deal" from his statutory
entitlement, i.e., Mr. Gates1 child.
A.

Principles of Review of Modification Proceedings.

The basic principles upon which an Appellate Court reviews a
Trial Court's divorce modification proceedings are well defined
in the case of Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d, 1297, 1299
(Utah 1981) :
"The modification of Divorce Decrees is
a matter of equity, and it is the duty and
perogative of this Court to review both the
facts and the law. (Citations omitted)
However, it is likewise true that on review
this Court will accord considerable
deference to the judgment of the Trial Court
due to its advantage position and will not
disturb the action of that Court unless the
evidence clearly preponderates to the
contrary, or the Trial Court abuses its
discretion or misapplies principles of law."
(Citations omitted)
Further, an Appellate Court may affirm a Trial Court's
decision on proper grounds even though different than those
relied upon by the Trial Court.

Branch v. Western Petroleum,

Inc., 657 P.2d, 267, 276 (Utah 1982)
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B.
Obligations.

Utah Legal Principles Regarding Child Support
The Utah Legislature, and Courts of the State of

Utah, have considered as primary the parental obligation of support when addressing divorcing parties and their children's
rights.
"The Utah Legislature has clearly stated
the public policy of the State of Utah is
that 'Children shall be maintained from the
resources of responsible parents, thereby
relieving or avoiding, at least in part, the
burden of [support] often borne by the
general citizenry through welfare programs.'
Citing, Utah Code Ann. §78-45-b-l.l (1987);
Peterson v. Peterson, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. 26,
28 (1988).
As stated in Martinez v. Martinez, 748 P.2d, 593, 595,
(Utah App. 1988):
"Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3, -4 (1987)
established the obligation of both parents to
support their children and '[a] child's right
to that support is paramount.' Citing,
Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d, 393, 394
(Utah 1985) 'The Utah Supreme Court continued, 'the Trial Court may fashion such
equitable Orders in relation to the children
and their support as is reasonable and
necessary, considering not only the needs of
the children, but also the ability of the
parent to pay.'
In Race v. Race, 740 P.2d, 253, 255 (Utah 1988) the
Court again underscored the importance of the child's rights when
it stated:
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"Although the awarding of visitation and
child support is within the Court's discretion, the Court must consider the child's
paramount right to and need for his parents
support. (Citation omitted) The
Court-Ordered child support is an obligation
imposed for the benefit of the children, not
the divorcing spouse."
Finally, the Utah Supreme in Lord v. Shaw, 682, P.2d,
853, (Utah 1984), the broad equitable power of a Trial court
relating to child support stated:
"In matters concerning the custody and
support of children, because of their highly
equitable nature, it is appropriate for the
Trial Court to take into consideration the
entire circumstances in making any order of
enforcement of.the decree, by contempt or
otherwise having in mind his equitable powers,
to make any adjustments he may think fair and
justified." Lord v. Shaw, at 856.
C.

The Court's Increase in Child Support is an

Appropriate Exercise of its Equitable Powers.

The Court

increase of Mr. Gates' child support obligation was a wise and
appropriate use of the broad equitable discretion vested in Trial
Courts to insure the welfare of children based upon their
parents' ability to care for them.

The Trial Court chose not to

tolerate Mr. Gates' active omission when seeking and receiving a
Court-Ordered increase of child support based upon nondisclosure
of his true income. Mrs. Gates believes, and after a review of
the record it is clearly appropriate, that the Court should have
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increased the child support and made it retroactive to January,
1986 when Mr. Gates began making $6,000.00 per month.

As stated

in Race v. Race, supra, child support is an obligation imposed
for the benefit of the child not the divorcing spouse.

In this

instance, the child has been deprived of three years of increased
child support benefits to which the child was entitled.

We

believe it is appropriate that this Court consider that issue on
appeal, i.e., making the increased child support retroactive to
1986 for the benefit of Mr. Gates1 child.
The Argument made on appeal by Mr. Gates is similar to
the argument rejected by the Court in Druce v. Druce, 7 38, P.2d,
633 (Utah 1987).

In Druce, the District Court entered a Temporary

Order of Child Support prior to the final Decree. At the time of
the final Decree, Mr. Druce was in arrears $1,200.00 on the
Temporary Order.

However, the final Decree did not require that

Mr, Druce pay the amounts that were delinquent at the time of
entry of the final Order.

Subsequently, Mrs. Druce obtained a

Judgment for the delinquent child support payments which had
accrued to the date of entry of the final Divorce Decree. Mr.
Druce appealed, asserting that the Temporary Support Order had
merged into the final Decree and since the final Decree was
silent on the delinquent temporary support payments the doctrine
of res judicata precluded Plaintiff from seeking unpaid amounts.
Affirming the lower court's judgment, the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
-15-

"We recognize that a few jurisdictions
have adopted the Rule advocated by the
Defendant. (Citations omitted) However, we
disagree with those decisions. A rule that
denies recovery of accrued unpaid obligations
under a Temporary Order, unless they are
expressly observed by the final Order are
'entirely senseless . . . [because]
it awards the recalcitrant husband for noncompliance with the Court's Order by excusing
him from payment of arrears.1 H. Clark, Law
of Domestic Relations, Section 14.2, at 428
(1968)." Druce v. Druce at 634.
This Court may also uphold the Lower Court's decision
based upon a reformation of contract theory.

Paragraph 6

(R.75) of the Stipulation Modifying the Decree of Divorce entered
into April 10, 1986, states:
"The parties acknowledge that this
Stipulation is based upon circumstances of
each party as they presently exist and, subject to the Court's approval, the Divorce
Decree and subsequent Orders may be modified
upon this Stipulation and subject to its terms
being incorporated therein."
It is clear that both parties intended the Stipulation
to reflect their current circumstances.

Mrs. Gates believed that

Mr. Gates' income was not greater than at the time of the May,
1985 hearing, which she believed to be $2,300.00, rather than
$6,000.00, per month.

Recently, the Utah Supreme Court has held
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that a unilateral mistake may be a basis for reformation to conform the agreement to what both parties intended.
State Bank v. Stangl, 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 (1989).

Guardian
The equitable

remedy of reformation would be an appropriate remedy to benefit Mr.
Gates1 child who has been deprived of his father's increased
bounty the last three years by his fatherfs unconscionable
bargaining.
The Court's equitable powers were exercised in favor of
a reasonable and just decision which takes into consideration Mr.
Gatesf current income and reflects the appropriate amount under
the Child Support Guidelines which he should be paying.

II
THE TRIAL COURTfS ASSESSMENT WHEN JUDGING
CREDIBILITY OF THE PARTIES SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED
ON APPEAL.
Mr. Gates erroneously claims that there were no
misrepresentations which would act as a basis for modification.
In reply to this erroneous statement, the legal principle is that
the Trial Court sat through a one-day trial listening to the
testimony, receiving exhibits and examining the facts. As
recently stated by this Court:
"Under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
52(a), we defer to the Trial Court's determination of the credibility of witnesses. We
see no reason in the record to disagree with
the Judgment of the Trial Court Judge, who was
in the arena and observed the combatants in
-17-

person." Johnson v. Johnson, Utah Adv. Rep.
22, 24 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
The following evidence was received during the hearing:
a)

Mrs. Gates, at the time of entering into the

Stipulation to increase child support, believed that Mr. Gates1
income was the same as he had represented to the Court in July,
1985.

[Trans. P.17, L.6 through L.13]
b)

Mr. Gates provided no information to Mrs. Gates

regarding his income either verbally or by documentation when
they entered into the Stipulation.

[Trans. P.17, L.14 through

P.18, L.9]
c)

Mr. Gates testified that the discussions which

resulted in the Stipulation to increase child support in 1986
began in September, 1985, approximately one month after the parties had been in Court on Mrs. Gates' Petition to Modify.
[Trans. P.48, L.12 through L.18]
d)

Mr. Gates testified at the time of trial that he was

making approximately $8-10,000.00 per month and that he allegedly
told Mrs. Gates the figure.
e)

[Trans. P.47, L.12 through L.23]

The Court admitted Mr. Gates1 tax returns for 1985

showing that he had a monthly income of $3,405.00 per month,
showing that he earned $1,200.00 per month more than what he
claimed in the July, 1985 hearing.
P.53, L.3]
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[Trans. P.52, L.10 through

f) Mr. Gates admitted in cross-examination that the
Findings of Fact and Order entered January, 1986, was not an
accurate statement of his income at the time.

[Trans. P.70, L.4

through L.7]
g)

Counsel for Mrs. Gates was never involved in nego-

tiations which resulted in the increase in child support; counsel
for Mr. Gates simply drafted an agreement which was forwarded to
counsel for Mrs. Gates and subsequently modified to include the
provision that the Stipulation was based upon circumstances as
they presently existed.

[Dep. of Glen M. Richman, Feb. 7, 1989,

Trans. P.29, L.12 through P.31, L.12]
There is substantial evidence in the record to support
the Trial Court's conclusion that Mr. Gates was lying and that
Mrs. Gates was duped into an agreement which did not take into
consideration the true facts as they then existed.
Ill
THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN AWARDING MR. GATES THE
TAX EXEMPTION FOR THE PARTIES' MINOR CHILD.
Paragraph 3 of the Court's Order Modifying Decree of
Divorce and Judgment grants Mr. Gates, the noncustodial parent,
the tax exemption for the parties' minor child.

The Trial

Court's award of the tax exemption to Mr. Gates violates the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution in light of the 1982
Tax Reform Act and its effect on 26 UCS, Section 152(e)(1988).
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The Trial Courtfs award of the tax exemption to Mr. Gates is
contrary to Federal law and Utah's interpretation of the general
requirement imposed by Section 152(e) of the Internal Revenue
Service Code.

(See Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P.2d, 69, 72 (Utah

App. 1988) and Fulmer v. Fulmer, 761 P.2d, 942, 950 (Utah App.
1988)
The Trial Court was without jurisdiction to enter an
Order contrary to the plain provisions of Internal Revenue
Service Code. While the issue was not appealed, it is
appropriate for this Court's remedial power to address the error.
IV
THE COURT SHOULD AWARD MRS. GATES COSTS REASONABLE
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR DEFENDING THIS APPEAL.
Under Rule 33(a) and 40(a) of the Rule of the Utah Court
of Appeals, this Court has the power to award costs and attorney's fees to Mrs. Gates for defending a "frivolous" appeal.
Porco v. Porco, 752, P.2d, 365 (Utah App. 1988)

The basis for

the award is the clear deception which Mr. Gates foisted on Mrs.
Gates and the Trial Court and, despite the Court's unequivocal
ruling on the point.

Mr. Gates continued misuse of the Utah Court

system should not be tolerated by this Court.

Mrs. Gates was

required to expend considerable monies in proving Mr. Gates had
failed to be honest.

Mrs. Gates is again in the position of

spending significant sums on attorney's fees to prove the same
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point.

Under these circumstances, this Court should award costs

and attorney's fees to Mrs. Gates.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Gates1 attempt to hide behind legal principles which
protect legitimate interests of divorcing parties while
approaching the matter with clearly "unclean hands" should to be
condoned by this, or any other Court.

The Trial Court saw

through the veil of deceit which Mr. Gates actively wove around
his wife, disenfranchising their child from the benefits of
increased child support from 1986 through 1989. While Mr. Gates'
ommissions when entering into the Stipulation with his wife in
1986 may not fit into any clear-cut, square-pegged legal theory
upon which redress is available, the Court's exercise of its
broad equitable powers increasing the child support to a legal
which is commensurate with Mr. Gates' current income, produces the
most equitable result when considering the primacy of Mr. Gates'
support obligation to his child.

DATED this

Q

day of November, 1989.
LITTLEFIELD &-^PETERSON

PAJJL WOOD
^Attorneys for Respondent
39669 39673
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